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Iraq mosaic formed of the different minorities survived for a long while; a beauty that has not 
remained for long. The mosaic changed to ruins following the counterinsurgency. The war in 
Iraq led to a complete chaos against all aspects of the society. It has caused a massive influx 
of migration and displacement; it also led to fragmentation in the society that eventually 
culminated in deterioration in human security of all the people from different communities. 
The political, personal and community security issues and challenges are discussed in the 
study showing political repression, human rights violations, lack of rule of law and justice, 
physical violence, human trafficking, inter-ethnic tensions and terrorism.  
KEYWORDS: insurgency, counterinsurgency, human security, political security, personal 
security, community security, Iraq 
 
Felkelés elleni műveletek hatása a humán biztonságra  
Esettanulmány Irak példája alapján (2003–2011) 
 
A különféle kisebbségekből kialakított iraki mozaik sokat látott és még többet túlélt, azonban 
mégsem maradhatott fenn. A felkelés leverése következtében a mozaik romokká vált. Az iraki 
háború a társadalom valamennyi szegmensében teljes káoszhoz vezetett, valamint hatalmas 
migrációs és kitelepítési hullámot idézett elő. A társadalom széttagoltságához vezetett, amely 
elkerülhetetlen következménye lett a különböző közösségekből származók humán 
biztonságának jelentős romlása. A tanulmány a politikai, egyéni és közösségi biztonsági 
kérdéseket és kihívásokat tárgyalja, kitérve a politikai elnyomásra, az emberi jogok 
megsértésére, a jogállamiság és az igazságosság hiányára, a fizikai erőszakra, az 
emberkereskedelemre, az etnikumok közötti feszültségekre és a terrorizmusra is. 
KULCSSZAVAK: Irak, iraki háború, humán biztonság, kisebbségek 
 
Introduction 
The History of insurgency and minority issues in Iraq precedes the 2003 invasion. The 
Arabization of the minorities affected their status, which was evident in different events and 
cases. Iraq is mainly composed of three main communities: the Sunni, the Shia and the Kurds 
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(who are mostly Sunni). However, the Mosaic that forms the country is even more complex as 
it is composed of many ethnic, religious, and ethno-religious minorities. 
The Iraqi government accommodated the Kurds during the Iraq-Iran war; a strategy they 
used to persuade the Kurds not to support Tehran. Nevertheless, the two Kurdish rivals, the 
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), reacted to this 
accommodation differently. Despite this, in 1988, the Iraqi forces attacked Kurdish targets, 
including the Halabja incident where 5000 were killed.3 Additionally, in 1988, the Iraqi 
government launched its ‘Anfal campaign’ against the Kurds forcing Kurds to leave their 
houses, thus setting up a “cordon sanitaire” along the borders with Iran. Yet, after the 1991 
Gulf war, the displaced Kurdish people were able to return to their villages in that zone.4 
The 1991 Gulf war was followed by uprisings in the south by the Shia and in the north 
by the Kurds. This was when Kurdish Guerillas “occupied nearly all of the areas they 
considered historically Kurdish including Kirkuk. Some vengeance killings took place as the 
population acted out its anger against those associated with the Iraqi government, ... the 
government soon mounted a counter-offensive and quickly crushed the uprisings”.5 This was 
when the “no-fly zone” was declared over northern Iraq. In October 1991, the Iraqi 
government withdrew from Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniyah granting de facto autonomy for 
the Kurds. This guaranteed the return of Kurds to the area while it led to the expulsion of 
Arabs living in the area. Consequently, the Iraqi government focused on the Arabization of 
Kirkuk. “Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians came under constant pressure to sign “ethnic 
identity correction” forms relinquishing their ethnicity and registering officially as Arabs”.6 
March 2003 marked the turning point in Iraq’s history. This was when the invasion 
started; the invasion was a US call. In November 2002, at the NATO summit, President 
George W. Bush announced the decision to assemble a “coalition of the willing”. In March 
2003, the initial list of countries with forty-nine states was announced; by the end of the year 
the list was reduced to forty-eight after Costa Rica left the coalition. Even though this number 
was announced differently by dissimilar resources, only four nations sent troops during the 
invasion, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland.7 
 
                                                 
3 Katzman 2010, 1. 
4 HRW, 2004: 13. 
5 HRW, 2004: 13–14. 
6 HRW, 2004: 15. 
7 Carney 2011, 1. 
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Figure 1. 
Map of Iraq showing the Ethno-Religious Population Distribution Before 2014 
(Daily Telegraph, base map from UNOCHA) 
 
When the US removed Saddam Hussein from power aiming at replacing the regime, the 
region shifted to a protracted sectarian violence in a collapsed state. It produced security and 
organization vacuum; the security forces were not in place anymore and the level of crime 
increased. Violence against the American forces started in the conservative religious city of 
Falluja. The attacks against the US forces and the counter attacks gradually increased in the 
city and spread throughout the country.  
On April 16, 2003, General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command, 
issued a “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” in which he noted that “I am creating the 
Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] to exercise powers of government temporarily.”8 
President Bush said that the CPA would establish “an orderly country in Iraq that is free and 
at peace, where the average citizen has a chance to achieve his or her dreams”.9 To develop 
the constitution of the new country, the US announced the formation of a constitutional 
council; however, this was rejected by the Iraqis. This formed two rivals: the Americans with 
those working for them or part of the new administration structure on the one side and those 
opposing the Americans on the other. The conflict became even more complex with the 
different sects being part of the conflict and with the rising of the different insurgencies 
                                                 
8 Dobbins et. al. 2009, 11. 
9 Dobbins et. al. 2009, 11. 
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leading to a low intensity war. The invasion of Iraq was initially a conventional war but 
developed into a counterinsurgency campaign.10 
After the 2003 war, there was a change in the sectarian relations in Iraq. With the Shi’a 
triumph, Sunnis had to familiarize themselves with the new “minority status”11 “[T]he roles 
have been reversed: Sunnis have replaced their Shi’i compatriots as the self-perceived victims 
of sectarian discrimination. It goes without saying that the previous regime was not a “Sunni 
regime” any more than today’s is a Shi’i regime”.12 The flipped status was attempted through 
the compensation of the victims (the Kurds and the Shiites) and the punishment of the 
transgressors (the Sunnis); where the victims were competing to take lead. The first expansion 
of violence beyond the conflict between the two rivals was in August 2003. It was a car bomb 
destroying the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad killing 19 people. After two weeks another 
explosion targeted the UN headquarters, killing Sergio Viera de Mello, the UN Secretary-
General’s Special Representative, and 19 others.13 
Kirkuk witnessed the most severe inter-ethnic tensions between Kurds, Turkomans, and 
Arabs. Violence erupted between Arabs and Kurds and deadly violence exploded between 
Turkomans and Kurds. Kurds fought to achieve federalism, while the Turkomans and the 
Arabs were against this.14 
Since 2003 Iraq has become a battlefield for al-Qaeda. The marginalization of the Sunni 
community led to even more conflicts and the resurgence of al-Qaeda. Bombing Sunni 
resistance led to a high number of displaced and to a higher level of extremism, which created 
a humanitarian crisis that ended up in targeting the Shia leading to a chaotic situation. In 
2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq started to implement his strategic 
priorities on the ground, expanding the region beyond Iraq and engaging in mass killings even 
of other Muslims. By the year 2007, the Iraqi people started considering this movement as 
terrorism. This is the moment when the al-Qaeda lost the hearts and the minds of the people. 
This extremism pushed more Iraqis to support the ‘Sahwa’ (Awakening).15 
Al-Anbar tribe started its uprising against the al-Qaeda in Iraq in September 2006; which 
was referred to as Sahwa al-Anbar. This was due to the aggressive measures used by al-
Qaeda. However, it is also related to the fact that al-Qaeda opposed any tribal structure that 
might affect the alliance with al-Qaeda.16 The disloyalty that al-Qaeda saw from the Sunni 
communities and the Sunni’s will for political participation led to massive executions. On the 
other hand, these measures raised awareness amongst the tribes questioning whether this was 
truly Islam and that tribal affiliation was a key social safety.17 
 
                                                 
10 Carney 2011, 1. 
11 Haddad 2014, 69. 
12 Haddad 2014, 82. 
13 Metz 2007, 1. 
14 HRW, 2004, 1. 
15 Ross, Gartenstein-Ross & Jensen 2015, 1. 
16 Ross, Gartenstein-Ross & Jensen 2015, 102. 
17 Ross, Gartenstein-Ross & Jensen 2015, 102. 
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Figure 2. 
Overall Fragility Trend (2006-2011) 
(Fund for Peace 2019. https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/) 
 
The first permanent government was formed by Nouri al-Malki in May 2006, as 
successor of the Iraqi transitional government that replaced the Iraqi Interim Government in 
May 2005. From 2006 to 2008 the State Fragility Index18 showed extremely high alert where 
the rank ranged between two and five. During the period from 2009 to 2011 the index ranged 
from 6 to 9.19 Figure (2) below illustrates the State Fragility Index in Iraq in the period 
between 2006 and 2011.20 The graph includes some improvements, though it is still within the 
high alert category.  
 
1. Different categories… different interests… segregation 
“As the state collapsed, the illusory veneer of relative uniformity and harmony that the Ba’ath 
had forcefully and violently upheld was abruptly removed, unleashing passions and identities 
that had been at best, poorly understood, and at worst, completely overlooked.”21 
The focus of communal groups in Iraq is mainly on Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. However, 
beyond this the other distinction exists between diverse ethnic, religious, sectarian, and 
linguistic groups. These minorities have faced intimidation and persecution resulting from this 
diversity and due to stereotyping of the majority. Some minorities have a distinct ethnic 
background; others have a different religion or sect, while others have unique ethno-religious 
background. Those diverse backgrounds embraced cultural distinction with different customs, 
traditions, clothing, and language.  
                                                 
18 In State Fragility Index country ranking is according to the following: from 1-5 it refer to those with very high 
alert, ranking from 6-9 refers to those with high alert, 10-31 alert, 32-60 high warning, 61-95 elevated warning, 
96-119 warning, 120-132 stable, 133-149 more stable, 150-160 very stable, 161-171 sustainable, 172-178 very 
sustainable. 
19 Fund for Peace 2019. 
20 No data available prior to 2006. 
21 Haddad 2014, 68. 
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Discrimination against minorities already existed prior to 2003 and also during the 
different phases of the insurgency. Discrimination was evident in their daily life events. In 
some cases, discrimination was also reflected in the law. For example, Law No. 105 of 1970 
prohibits the practice of the Baha’i faith, and a 2001 resolution prohibits the practice of the 
Wahhabi branch of Islam.22 The absence of recognition of some religious minorities in Iraq, 
such as Baha’is, Kaka’is, and Zoroastrians is still a systematic official denial.23 
 
2. Insurgency 
There is a wide range of insurgencies in Iraq that started after 2003, which have passed 
through different phases. The first phase of insurgencies lasted from 2003 to 2011 following 
the invasion of Iraq. This refers to the period following the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
where insurgency was mainly against the US-led multinational force along with inter-ethnic 
tensions. The other phase started after the US withdrawal in 2011, however, a resurgence of 
the different groups spurred up in 2013. 
Different groups with different ideologies and different levels of extremism have 
emerged, grown and affected the whole region. Some are fighting to change the government 
while others are striving to affect the people themselves, in many cases affecting the 
minorities, as well as facing the majority. Some have operated in coalitions, while others 
clashed with the other insurgents. Some are supporting the return of the Iraqi security forces 
to the Sunni sect, while others oppose it.  
The year 2006 marked the turning point of insurgency in Iraq. This is the so called “Al-
Sahwa” translated as Awakening. The Sahwa movement refers to the change in the Sunni 
insurgency position, when they took up arms against al-Qaida in Iraq.24 In 2011, the ground 
forces withdrew from Iraq, at the same time when the Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki failed to 
integrate the Sunni. It led to the exclusion policy started by arresting the bodyguards of the 
Sunni Finance Minister. Since then, violence started with Sunni calls to support the armed 
resistance. This initiated tribal militias and insurgent groups (such as the Ba‘athist Jaysh Rijal 
al-Tariq al-Naqshabandia – JRTN).25 Figure (3) below illustrates the different insurgent 
groups which were active during the period 2003-2018, according to Stanford University. 
About eleven groups started their activities in 2003, six started in 2006/2007, and four in 
2013/2014. The following is a list of some insurgency groups active in Iraq during the period 
2013-2019. The list shows the complexity in understanding the allies and rivals within the 
insurgency groups. It shows the different affiliations and the controversial support provided to 





                                                 
22 UNHCR, 2018. 
23 Salloum 2016. 
24 Adnan & Reese 2014, 1. 
25 Adnan & Reese 2014, 1. 
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The Islamic State (IS) 
The Islamic State (IS) is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is an Islamic Salafist organization that was 
established with the vision of transnational Islamic State. The IS traces its origin to early 2000 
when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi from Jordan became a militia and started Jama’at al-Tawhid 
wal-Jihad in the Kurdish area of Sulaymaniya targeted by the US troops during the 2003 US 
invasion of Iraq. This group had three major targets: the Shia, the international community, 
and Jordan; and hence their terrorist activities were conducted as such. In September 2004, 
Zarqawi announced the allegiance with al-Qaeda, where the group was then called al-Qaeda 
in Iraq. The relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda was tense due to different 
visions and strategies. However, the group remained attractive for supporters and followers. 
Ideologically, all followers come from the Saudi Wahhabism, those who believed that the 
Shia were heretics. Zarqawi died in June 2006, and al-Qaeda in Iraq appointed Abu Ayyub al-
Masri as the new leader. Four months later, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) was created.26 The 
group faced a decline after 2011, but later it gained back its strength when it got involved in 
the Syrian Civil war. Its name was changed to ISIS at that time.  
                                                 
26 Shamieh & Szenes 2015, 363. 
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Map of the Insurgents in Iraq (2003-2018) 
(Source: Stanford University [2019] available at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/maps/view/iraq) 
 
ISIS used intensive attacks targeting civilians - including Shia, Kurds and especially 
against minorities - who did not accept their vision. ISIS also targeted the Iraqi Security 
Forces and the international forces. On the ground ISIS fought against the Iraqi security 
forces, Iraqi militias, the Kurdish peshmerga, the Syrian government forces, the Syrian rebel 
groups, and the international forces. 
Supporters of ISIS ranged from individuals to countries, though there is no clear 
evidence of any country support. Some claims refer to the Turkish support to ISIS. Support 
included: facilitation of the passage of foreign jihadists and their families across the Turkish 
border into the areas controlled by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the treatment of ISIS wounded in 
Turkish hospitals, overlooking ISIS activities in Turkey, attacking the Self-Administration in 
Rojava - North and East Syria, and carrying out massacres against the Kurds.27 Many of ISIS 
members arrived from different nationalities, including Arabs and non-Arabs, Asians, and 
Europeans. This was accomplished through the marketing strategies ISIS used to recruit new 
members; locals and internationals.28 
 
The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries 
The General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR) is a Ba’athist militant group. 
An estimated 75,000 fighters are affiliated to GMCIR, mostly concentrated in Anbar, Salahal-
Din and Ninewah governorates.29 Reports also claim that the GMCIR is affiliated to the Jaysh 
Rajaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandia (JRTN – Army of the Men of the Naqshabandi Path). The 
                                                 
27 NRLS, 2019. 
28 Shamieh & Szenes 2015, 363. 
29 Heras 2014, 4. 
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relationship between this group and ISIS is also controversial, as they admit their participation 
in ISIS operations.30 However, GMCIR do share the same ideological orientation of ISIS. 
ISIS fights were mainly against non-Sunni religious and ethnic communities; whereas 
GMCIR is mainly a nationalist movement seeking Iraqi unity despite the controversial 
operations in which they were included.31 
GMCIR seeks substantial changes in the socio-political system and are anti-Maliki and 
anti-Iranian. The challenges this insurgency faces include the rejection of the Shia, the 
association with ISIS, as well as its association with tribal militias.32 
 
Jaysh Rajaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandia (JRTN) 
JRTN is considered to constitute the second largest insurgent group after ISIS. It was formed 
by Saddam Hussein's right-hand man, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri in 2006 as the main front for 
Baathist insurgents. This group is an amalgamation of the secular nationalism and the 
Naqshbandi Sunni Islam; however, it utilizes the jihad terminology to gain religious 
legitimacy. Despite its distinct ideology, JRTN worked closely with ISIS especially in 2014 
during the capturing of Mosul.33 
 
The Fallujah Military Council 
The Falluja Military Council was created to face ISIS operations in Falluja. On July 8 2014, 
ISIS reportedly executed a number of Fallujah gunmen for refusing to pledge allegiance to 
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi.34 
 
1920 Brigades 
The 1920 Brigades group name refers to the 1920 revolution against the British colonial rule 
in Iraq. The group was established in 2003 to free Iraq from foreign occupation particularly 
from “American military and political presence”.35 That is why the majority of the attacks 
were against the US soldiers and bases. In 2007 and after Al-Qaeda’s assassination of several 
group’s members; the 1920 Brigades were divided amongst themselves, opposing Al-Qaeda 
and cooperating with the US or vice versa. Those who decided to cooperate with Al-Qaeda 
and oppose the US formed a new group called Hamas Iraq. The assassinations, the divisions 
amongst the group and the internal conflict led to the weakening the group. As of 2019, there 
is limited presence of the group with no publications or political activity.36 
 
 
                                                 
30 Adnan & Reese 2014, 1. 
31 Adnan & Reese 2014, 1. 
32 Heras 2014, 4. 
33 CISAC, 2019a. 
34 Adnan & Reese 2014. 
35 CISAC, 2019a. 
36 CISAC, 2019b. 
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The Islamic Army in Iraq 
The Islamic Army group in Iraq (IAI) was formed in 2003 following the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
by the United States and coalition military forces. From 2003-2011, the group targeted the US 
military forces, while in 2006 several clashes were reported against Al-Qaeda. The group’s 
operations declined in 2008 and rose again in 2014. The IAI’s vision is to participate in a 
political solution for Iraq.37 
 
3. Counterinsurgency 
Following 2003, the coalition forces removed all the traces of the previous regime; which led 
to a high level of unemployment, lack of food security, lack of economic security, and lack of 
national security.38 
Different nationalities participated in the Coalition and the counterinsurgency battles. A 
significant number of troops were composed of US troops included half of the ground forces 
and the other half formed by the other nationalities (see figure 4 below).39 During the invasion 
phase the belligerents included the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, and 
the Peshmerga forces supported by Canada, Netherlands and Italy from one side and the Iraqi 
government from the other side. During the post invasion phase (2003-2011), the belligerents 
included the United States, the United Kingdom, the Coalition Forces, the new Iraqi 





International Troops in Iraq (2003-2011) 
(Raw data available in Brookings Report “Iraq Index”) 
                                                 
37 Adnan & Reese 2014, 19. 
38 Mabon & Royle 2017, 1. 
39 O’Hanlon & Livingston 2013, 1. 
109 
HADTUDOMÁNY, 2021. ÉVI ELEKTRONIKUS LAPSZÁM 
Different other players of the conflict were active, but in some cases, it was not even 
clear whether they were supporting the insurgents or the counterinsurgents. The ups and 
downs in the American-Turkish relations were also evident in the variations of support.40 
Private security contractors were also employed to provide services in Iraq. Services 
included: protecting fixed locations, guarding traveling convoys, providing security escorts, 
and training military personnel. The peak was in 2009 with employing more than 15,000 
individuals.41 
Counterinsurgency experienced in Iraq ranged from absolute failure as assessed by the 
different belligerents to some success. The ‘Operation Vigilant Resolve’ that started in April 
2004 in response to the killing of four American contractors in the city was an example of the 
information operation (IO) failure. It was the first Marine assault on Falluja, where two 
marine battalions began their attack on insurgent positions. This battle confronted 300,000 
citizens along with 2,000 insurgents. The battle was considered unsuccessful, and a turning 
point in US counterinsurgency strategy:  
“Two reinforced battalions were tasked with isolating and attacking a medium-sized city 
. . . Depending on the tactical situation, manpower shortages may be compensated for by 
increased firepower, which the Marine commanders were unwilling-or unable-to apply in 
Valiant Resolve. Indeed, it appears that leaders at the scene quickly came to this conclusion. 
The operation never progressed beyond the foothold stage. Marines gained access to the 
urban area (in that case, outlying industrial neighborhoods), but did not penetrate to the 
heart of the city, much less take it.”42 
Reports referred that the marines did not expect the high level of preparedness of the 
insurgents, which caused heavy losses. It was definitely a huge loss in the information 
operations. The insurgents themselves considered it a great victory, where the city became 
totally controlled by the insurgents and the supporting foreign fighters.43 
Other operations were successful. Following the Fallujah failure, Muqtada al Sadr’s anti-
government Mahdi militia attacked government forces in the city. Within three weeks the 
Sadr’s militia was defeated. This opened eyes back again to Fallujah.44 
In 2008, to achieve the long-term security plan, the US paid salaries through the Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki to the fighters, so that this could be the future responsibility of 
the ministry of defense, while providing support to the reconstruction fund. Due to the lack of 
transparency (as nobody knew where this money went), the situation became increasingly 
chaotic.45 
“In essence, Sunni Arabs tribes became part of the Sunni ‘problem’, struggling for 
power and resources, and divided over how to respond to the worsening political-economic 
conditions. Al-Maliki was able to use these schisms for his own benefit, playing Sunni groups 
and tribes against one another across his tenure. As Sunni Arab tribal politics interacted with 
                                                 
40 Dağci 2012, 1. 
41 CRS, 2019.  
42 Matthews 2010, 9. 
43 Matthews 2010. 
44 Matthews 2010. 
45 Mabon & Royle 2017.  
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politics at the national level, the identity of the tribal movement that had been briefly 
established during the Sahwa eroded, and the tribes once again became fragmented.”46 
Iraq’s neighboring countries were also part of the game. Kuwait for example had 
concerns of the Iranian influence and of the spillover of Iraqi Shia across its own borders; 
therefore, Kuwait provided support to the US military action. Qatar also supported the US 
military by hosting the central command; though it also hosted the former Iraqi Baathists.47 
Iran also supported the Iraqi Shiite insurgency by “material support”.48 
Sectarian violence has escalated since counterinsurgency started, different parties have 
been engaged in the conflict and the complexity and intensity of the conflict have increased 
by time. Counterinsurgency operations were activated and support to the different parties 
were provided either internally or externally and either physically or financially. Different 
lines of communications were initiated either as rivals or supporters.  
 
4. Impact of Counterinsurgency 
The counterinsurgency has led indirectly to an escalation of refugee influx along with the 
deterioration in human security. This section illustrates the factors affected. 
Although displacement was ongoing, there were two exact peeks; the first in 2006 when 
the Sunni-Shia violence forced thousands of minority families, the second in 2008 when 
violence against Christians, Yezidis forced thousands of families to flee their homes.49 25-30 
percent of the population have been forced to leave their homes and are either internally or 
externally displaced.50 More than 80 percent of the Mandaean population were forced to 
leave; 60 percent of Christians and other ethnic or religious groups are displaced. Most of the 
Yezidi and Kaka’i were forced from Ninewa and subsisting as IDPs.51 Table (1) below shows 
the number of IDPs throughout the period. Despite the significant number of returnees, that 
displacement has yet to be over until the current period. 
Table 1. 
IDPs in Iraq (2003-2011) 
(Source: Brookings Report “Iraq Index”) 









                                                 
46 Mabon & Royle, 2017, 91. 
47 Alterman, 2007. 1. 
48 CFR, 2008. 
49 Lamani, 2009. 
50 Lamani, 2009. 
51 IILHR, 2016. 
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The following section involves a quick summary of the three most relevant human 
insecurity dimensions: that of community, political, and personal. 
 
Community Security 
Iraqis are facing the breakdown of their families and communities because of the conflict, 
collapse of cultures; people are desperate that the community will get back to the pre-2003 
era. The Iraqis interviewed revealed that the suffering during Saddam regime was not as 
harmful as the suffering they are facing now as individuals, communities and as a nation. 
They noted the inter-ethnic and identity-based tensions pre-2003, but they declared that the 
situation has deteriorated since there is no potential of advancing back to that point. 
"At his most vulnerable position, Saddam Hussein used sectarianism and nationalism as 
weapons against his internal enemies," the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) wrote in a 
recent briefing on the risk of a renewed breakout of large-scale violence. "Today's Iraqi Shiite 
parties and government appear to be doing far worse as governmental rule is justified on a 
sectarian basis."52 
The rise in terrorism was evident through the escalating number of terrorist attacks (see 
figure 5 below). Again, the attacks may have decreased later; however, this has not 
approached the pre-2003 era. Moreover, it is clearly evident through the “unprecedented 




Terrorists Attacks per Day on Civilian Targets in Iraq  
(Source: Stern & McBride, 2013) 
 
Number of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks has also increased, figure (6) below 
shows the number of deaths resulting from terrorism. The number has been on the rise since 
the 2003 invasion. Tensions including ethnic and religious tensions have affected all factions 
of the society.  
 
                                                 
52 IRIN, 2013. 
53 Stern & Mcbride, 2013, 2. 
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Figure 6. 
Deaths from Terrorism, 2000-2015  
(Source: IEP, 2016:16) 
 
According to UNHCR statistics, about 700,000 Iraqis took refuge in Syria between 
October 2003 and March 2005. In the same period 5,843 cases (15,855 persons) were 
registered as asylum-seekers by UNHCR in Damascus out of which 36% were Christians.54 
 
Political Security 
Severe human rights violations have been prevalent in Iraq. Violations include war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, terror attacks and sexual abuse, leaving millions of civilians without 
home and forced them to flee.  
Abuses during detention and imprisonment have been on the rise. Iraq is the world’s 
third country in the number of prisoners. At least 169 prisoners were executed in 2013; this 
figure has been  the highest ever.55 According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2010) 
there is serious delays in the judicial review, some detainees spend years in custody without 
trial or even charge. Detainees face torturing with no access to families or lawyers. In 2010, 
Iraq was one of the most dangerous countries to work in the media, with no freedom of 
expression and no freedom of assembly.56 
Human rights violation is faced through the government, militias and even the 
international forces.  
“Thousands of classified files were published by Wikileaks. These showed, among other 
things, that US troops manning security roadblocks had shot dead many Iraqi civilians in 
previous years and that, contrary to their denials, the US military authorities had sought to 
keep a count of the number of Iraqi civilians killed in the conflict in Iraq. Revised estimates 
                                                 
54 UNHCR, 2005. 
55 Amnesty, 2014. 
56 HRW, 2010. 
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put the total number of civilian casualties in the conflict in Iraq between 2004 and 2009 at 
66,081.”57 
Corruption has also increased since 2003. According to Transparency International the 
corruption index reached 1.8 ranked Iraq as 175th country in 2011, whereas it was ranked 
113th in 2003 by its point 2.2. 
 
Personal Security 
Iraq was well known as one of the richest countries, with high level of literacy and a high 
number of professionals and university graduate. However, this is no longer a matter of 
comparison. A huge number of those immigrated, while the remaining is working under strain 
and threats.58 
Level of violence expanded to reach all the different regions and the different 
communities in Iraq. Minorities were the most affected; where they faced discrimination, 
violence and ethnic cleansing. Different massacres took place against different communities 
especially against the Yezidis. Those minorities were not part of the conflict, but they ended 
to be victims of the war. Gender-Based Violence (GBV) was also evident. In Basra, 133 
women were killed by Islamist militias in 2007. Their bodies were dumped in rubbish tips 
with notes warning others against "violating Islamic teachings".59 
Human trafficking has become a prevalent issue since 2003. Kidnapping especially in 
Baghdad has increased noticeably. Houses were found that stored girls for selling in other 
countries. Trafficking of kidnapped females to other countries has been on the rise since then. 
Statistics in this period are not available as the term human trafficking has yet to be used.  
In 2004, a survey conducted by Women International revealed that 90% of women in 
Iraq felt that there was a hope for a secured future. However, this percentage declined by 27% 




The war in Iraq led to a complete chaos against all aspects of the society. This has led to the 
increase in migration and displacement; it also led to the fragmentation that created different 
centers of mass, meaning various centers of gravity for the different segments of the society. 
The result is a massive deterioration in human security. The fragmentation and the diverse 
centers of mass also created a community that is  no longer like the original structure. In fact, 
new communities were multiplied that do not accept or appreciate the differences.  
While conflict has declined in the last few years, the level of security has not returned to 
pre-invasion levels. Number of terrorist attacks, deaths, and violence against the different 
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58 Ihsanoglu, 2007, 915. 
59 IRIN, 2010: 15. 
60 NCA, 2010. 
61 Khadim & Khrassn 2016. 
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minorities are still on the rise. The protracted conflict and the failure to reconstitute the 
government created a fertile base for terrorists to fight; new groups of insurgents are still 
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